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Federal Preemption of State Family
Property Law: The Marriage of
McCarty and Ridgway
LEONARD BIERMAN*
JOHN HERSHBERGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard McCarty and Patricia McCarty were married in Portland,
Oregon in March 1957, while Richard attended medical school.' Less
than two years later, Richard commenced active duty with the United
States Army.2 During the next 19 years, he served successive tours of
duty for the Army in five different cities across the United States. 3
The couple separated in October, 1976. 4 On December 1, 1976,
Richard McCarty initiated a divorce proceeding before the Superior
Court for the City and County of San Francisco.5 At the time of the
divorce, he was Chief of Cardiology at the Letterman Hospital on the
* Assistant Professor of Management, Texas A&M Business School; B.S., Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; M.A. (in economics), University of California, Los Angeles;
Fellow, Program in Law and Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 1978-80. Mem-
ber, District of Columbia Bar.
** J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center;, B.A., University of California, Los
Angeles. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Patrick J. Heneghan for the invaluable
inspiration he provided.
1. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 216 (1981).
2. Brief for Appellant at 6, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (copy on file at the
Pacic Law Journal).
3. 453 U.S. at 216.
4. Id.
5. Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
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Presidio Military Reservation in San Francisco and had attained the
rank of colonel.' In his petition to the superior court, the appellant
listed his nondisability military retirement benefits as separate prop-
erty.7 At the time of separation, the husband had served 220 months of
the 240 months required for eligibility for receipt of Army retired pay.8
At the divorce proceedings Patricia McCarty contested her husband's
characterization of the retirement interests.9 The superior court held,
in an unpublished opinion, that the military pension rights were divisi-
ble between the parties as quasi-community property pursuant to sec-
tion 4803 of the California Civil Code.' The trial court ordered the
pension to be divided as follows:
[pletitioner shall pay to respondent, as long as she lives, that portion
of his total monthly pension or retirement payment which equals
one-half (1/2) of the ratio of the total time between marriage and
separation during which petitioner was in the United States Army to
the total number of years he has served with the United States Army
at the time of retirement, and the Court retains jurisdiction to make
such determination at that time and to supervise distribution
thereof. 11
Richard appealed that part of the superior court's decision awarding
his wife an interest in the military retirement pay. Appearing before
the California Court of Appeal, he argued that the federal law creating
military pension rights preempted the application of California's com-
munity property law. In an unpublished decision, the California Court
of Appeal rejected his arguments and affirmed the lower court's divi-
sion of the military retirement benefits. 2 The California Supreme
Court denied Richard McCarty's petition for hearing, but the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The sole issue presented to the Supreme Court in McCarly was
whether federal statutes governing nondisability military retirement
pay preempt California courts from treating such compensation as
6. 453 U.S. at 216.
7. Brief, supra note 2, at 8. For a discussion concerning the distinction between separate
and community property, see text accompanying notes 19-29 infra.
8. Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
9. 453 U.S. at 217. The other community property of the spouse consisted of two cars, cash
and an uncollected debt. Id.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §4803.
11. Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9. In September, 1978 appellant retired from the Army and
began receiving his pension payment. Under the terms of the Court order, Ms. McCarty was
entitled to approximately 45% of the retired pay. 453 U.S. at 218.
12. The court of appeal concluded that the precise issue presented by appellant had already
been decided contrary to his interest inlnre Fithian, 10 Cal. 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). Moreover, the court determined that the Supreme Court's find-
ing concerning benefits under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 were inapposite to
military pension benefits. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
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community property divisible upon divorce. In a 6 to 3 decision writ-
ten by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court reversed the California
Court of Appeal, holding that federal law did, in fact, preempt the ap-
plication of state community property law in the area of military pen-
sion benefits.
Approximately one year after the Supreme Court's ruling in Mc-
Carty, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Pro-
tection Act. 3 The Act effectively overrules the narrow holding of the
McCarty case. 4 It amends Title 10 of 28 U.S.C. to include the follow-
ing new language: "a court may treat disposable [military] retired or
retainer pay. . . either as property solely of the member or as property
of the member and his spouse in accordance with [local] law."' 5
This article will evaluate the McCarty decision in light of the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement concerning federal pre-
emption of state family property law' 6 and in light of the recent passage
of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. The pur-
pose of the analysis is to highlight the possible continuing impact that
the McCarty case will have upon the preemption standard as it is ap-
plied to cases involving community property law. In pursuance of that
objective, this article will (1) provide a general survey of community
property law in California, (2) present an analysis of the federal pre-
emption doctrine and detail the past application by the Supreme Court
of that doctrine in the area of community property law, (3) examine
and analyze the holding and rationale of the McCarty decision,
(4) evaluate the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Ridg-
way v. Ridgway,"7 (5) consider the effect that the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act' 8 will have upon the preemption stan-
dard articulated by the Court in McCary, and (6) assess the possible
impact that the McCarty decision will have upon future case law and
the federal preemption standard.
13. S. 2248, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. Rc. H5953 (daily ed. August 16, 1982), H.R.
Rept. No. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Former Spouses' Protection
Act]. Congress sent the bill to President Reagan on August 27, 1982, and President Reagan signed
the bill into law on September 8, 1982.
14. For a discussion concerning the probable impact that the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act will have upon the McCarty preemption standard see infra notes 122-130
and accompanying text infra.
15. 128 Cong. Rec. H5953, H5957 (daily ed. August 16, 1982), H.R. Rept. No. 749, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15 (1982).
16. Le., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981). See infra notes 87-121 and accompanying
text.
17. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
18. Former Spouses' Protection Act, supra note 13.
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II. COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN CALIFORNIA
California is one of eight states19 embracing a system of community
property.2" Fundamental to the community property concept is the no-
tion that all property acquired during marriage, other than by gift, de-
vise, or descent, belongs to the spousal community. 21 Community
property law defines marriage in terms of a partnership. 2 Spouses are
presumed to contribute "equally to acquisitions [of the community] re-
gardless of the actual division of labor in the marriage and regardless
of which spouse actually 'earned' the property." 23 Hence, husband and
wife share a present, existing, and equal legal interest in the commu-
nity's acquisitions.
Community property rules govern property division upon the disso-
lution of marriage. Consistent with the basic notion of spousal equality
in community acquisitions, the California Civil Code24 directs state
courts to divide all community property equally between the spouses
upon divorce.25 Pension rights attributable to employment during mar-
riage are among the divisible items of community property.26 Pension
benefits have long been considered community property, because those
benefits "do not derive from the beneficence of the employer, but are
properly part of the consideration earned by the employee." 27 A
19. The remaining community property jurisdictions are Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
20. Community property law stems both from statute and from case law.
21. Property held before the marriage and property acquired during the marriage by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent is classified as separate property. W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAI, COM-
MUNIY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 81 (1975). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§5108-5110.
[California has adopted a statutory provision that defines as "quasi-comlmunity property" "all real
or personal property, wherever situate ... heretofore or hereafter acquired . . . which would
have been community property... [had the spouses] been domiciled in the state at the time of
[the property's acquisition]." Id. §4803. Quasi-community property is governed by general com-
munity property principles. Id.
22. See In re Marriage of Brigden, 80 Cal. App. 3d 380, 389, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722-23
(1978). W. DEFUNLAX AND M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§58-80 (2d ed.
1971); Prager, 2he Perstence of Separate Property Concepts in Calfornla's Community Property
System, 1849-1975, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1976).
23. Prager, supra note 22, at 6. The presumption is regarded as a rule of substantive property
law. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 593 (1979).
24. CAL. Civ. CODE §4800. Section 4800 does allow voluntary agreements between the par-
ties with regard to property division. Only in the absence of such agreement will the court define
the property division.
25. A spouse's right to receive one-half of the community estate is a substantive property
right wholly separable from the spouse's right to seek alimony or support.
A community property settlement merely distributes to the spouse property which, by
virtue of the marital relationship, he or she already owns. An alimony award, by con-
trast, reflects ajudgment that one spouse-even after the termination of the marriage-is
entitled to continuing support by the other.
439 U.S. at 593-94.
Among the community property jurisdictions, only Texas does not permit a court to award
alimony. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Tex. 1979).
26. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). See
also 439 U.S. at 594.
27. Inre Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371
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spouse's interest in the pension attaches even if the pension has not
formally vested.28 Pension benefits therefore often constitute an impor-
tant and sizeable community asset subject to division upon marital
dissolution.
Prior to the McCarty decision, California courts accorded military
pension benefits no special status; military pension benefits, like other
pension benefits, were subject to division at divorce under community
property principles.29 In McCarty, the Court considered whether the
approach followed by California courts was proper. In finding that it
was not, the Court invoked the dictates of the federal preemption
doctrine.
III. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Generally
American federalism is defined in large part by the principle that the
Constitution and congressional action exercised in pursuance thereof
enjoy supremacy over the constitutions and laws of the several states.
Federalism in general, and the Supremacy Clause ° in particular, give
rise to the doctrine of federal preemption. Defining the parameters of
that doctrine, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "[w]hen acts of state
legislatures. . . interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress,
made in pursuance of the Constitution. . .the act of Congress. . .is
supreme, and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of
powers not controverted, must yield to it."31
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[p]reemption of state
law by federal statute. . . is not favored. ' 32 This is especially true in
matters involving the exercise of state police powers.3 3 Because family
(1974). Even in the case of a "non-contributory" pension program, the benefits are still considered
community property since those benefits are property rights acquired during marriage. Id.
28. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). In
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the Supreme Court indicated that a "State's deci-
sion to treat as property benefits that arguably are not 'vested' is one that it is free to make." Id. at
594.
California courts have devised two approaches to the mechanics of dividing nonvested pension
rights. A court can either determine the present value of the future pension rights and award a
spouse a sum based upon that estimate, or it can award each spouse an appropriate portion of
each pension payment as it is paid. Id.
29. Note that pension benefits payable under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,
45 U.S.C. §§231-231u (1976) are not subject to division pursuant to community property laws.
See 439 U.S. at 590.
30. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 92-93 (1824).
32. Chicago & North Western Trans. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,317 (1981).
See generally Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (the exercise of federal
supremacy is not lightly presumed).
33. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[H]istoric police powers are
not superseded by the federal act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
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law and family property law (i.e., community property law) fall within
the area of state police powers, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[t]he whole subject of the domestic relationships of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of
the United States." 4
But in spite of the peculiarly local jurisdiction of family law, that law
does, under limited circumstances, remain subject to federal preemp-
tion. Recognizing the delicate balance that American federalism cre-
ates between state police powers and' the supremacy clause, the
Supreme Court has been particularly careful to fashion a narrow and
stringently applied test for evaluating the constitutionality of state fam-
ily laws. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,5 the Court articulated the fol-
lowing two-part preemption test:
On the rare occasions when state family law has come into conflict
with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the
Supremacy Clause to a determination of whether Congress has 'posi-
tively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted.
Wetmose v. Malkoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). A mere conffict in words
is not sufficient. State family and family property law must do 'major
damage,' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the
Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden. United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).36
B. Past Application of the Preemption Doctrine in the Area of
Community Property Law
The holding in McCarty follows directly from the majority's evalua-
tion of the content and scope of the federal preemption doctrine.
Therefore, it is essential to preface any analysis of the persuasiveness of
the majority opinion with a survey of the Court's past application of
the preemption doctrine in the area of community property law. On
only five occasions prior to .fcCarty had the Supreme Court ordered
the preemption of state community property law.37 The following
analysis illustrates the strictness of the past application of the preemp-
tion doctrine.
McCune v. Essig38 was the first case in which the Court held that
federal law preempted state community property law. The case arose
34. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
35. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
36. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
37. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199
U.S. 382 (1905).
38. 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
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when a deceased homesteader's daughter asserted, pursuant to commu-
nity property law in Washington, a claim for an undivided one-half
interest in her father's homestead. The Homestead Act39 itself specifi-
cally provided that the full interest in the homestead passed to the
widow first, and only in the case of her death did it go to the home-
steader's heirs or devisees. Because the Court recognized a conflict in
the terms of the federal and state statutory schemes, and because the
Court believed damage to the federal interests would result from the
application of Washington's community property laws, the Court or-
dered the state law to yield.
In Wissner v. Wissner,40 the Court held that National Service Life
Insurance (NSLI) proceeds were not subject to division under Califor-
nia's community property laws. The case involved an action by a de-
ceased serviceman's wife to obtain the NSLI proceeds. The Court held
that the insurance proceeds in question went to the deceased service-
man's parents, the named beneficiaries, rather than to his wife. The
Court premised its decision upon the express dictates of the federal
program. The federal act gave the insured "the right to designate the
beneficiary or beneficiaries" as well as "the right to change the benefici-
ary or beneficiaries."'" Moreover, the Court emphasized the fact that
the federal program provided that "[payments] to the named benefici-
ary 'shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable
to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable pro-
cess whatever, either before or after receipt.' "42 Recognizing that the
express language of the federal program conflicted with the normal op-
eration of state community property rules, the Court declared that the
state law was preempted.4'
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo" provides a final illustration of the past ap-
plication of the preemption test. Hisquierdo deserves special emphasis
since the Court there provided a clear and precise definition of the pre-
emption test. The Hisquierdo Court held that the Federal Railroad Re-
tirement Act of 197441 preempted community property law. California
39. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 STAT. 392 (1862).
40. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
41. 38 U.S.C. §802(g) (1976).
42. 338 U.S. at 659 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §454a (1976)).
43. Two other cases in which the Court found preemption of state community property law
are Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962), and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964). Both cases
involved the disposition of United States treasury bonds. In these two cases the Court held that
federal laws and regulations preempted the application of state community property laws in deter-
mining the disposition of the United States Bonds. The Court, as in the two cases cited immedi-
ately above, emphasized the existence of conflicting language and the incompatibility of the state
laws with the federal objectives.
44. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
45. 45 U.S.C. §§231-231t (1976).
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courts were consequently precluded from dividing railroad retirement
benefits pursuant to community property concepts. The Court utilized
a two-part test in evaluating the preemption issues. First, the Court
asked "whether Congress had 'positively required by direct enactment'
that state law be preempted."46 The Court found that California's
community property law violated part one of the test, since the express
language of section 231 of the Railroad Retirement Act provided that
"[n]ot withstanding any other law of the United States, or of any state
• ..no annuity. . . shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to
garnishment, or other legal process under any circumstances
whatsoever."'47
Noting that a "mere conflict in words is not [a] sufficient"4 8 basis on
which to find preemption, the Court introduced part two of the pre-
emption test, asking whether the application of state community prop-
erty law would "do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal
interests."49 The Court found that California's community property
laws also violated part two of the test. Specifically, the Court declared
that the application of community property laws would "reverse the
flow of incentives Congress originally intended,"50 because the effect of
applying community property law would be to reduce the benefits re-
ceived by those for whom they were intended. That effect, argued the
Court, would discourage the divorced railroad employee from retiring,
thereby frustrating the federal goals.5  Because state law conflicted
with the express terms of the federal statute and because the state law
would cause major damage to clear and substantial federal interests,
the Court ordered the community property law to yield. 2
IV. THE McCARTY DECISION53
The structure of the majority opinion in McCarty closely parallels
46. 439 U.S. at 580. Note that the McCarty Court phrased part one of the preemption test
somewhat differently. The McCarq
, 
Court instead asked whether "there [was] a conflict between
the terms of the federal [and state]. . . statutes." 453 U.S. at 232. The difference in the wording
would seem not to be critical since both forms ask essentially the same question-i.e., whether
there is evidence of a clear congressional intent to preempt state law.
47. 45 U.S.C. §231m (1976) (emphasis added).
48. 439 U.S. at 581.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 585.
51. Id. The Court did not develop its arguments in support of part two of the preemption
test as fully as it did in support of part one. The incompleteness of the argument in support of part
two of the test seems to result from the Court's finding that there was a conflict in express terms
between the state and federal programs. Apparently, the Hisquierdo Court believed that a conflict
in terms would produce an inherent conflict in operation.
52. In the final analysis, if the Court's supporting rationale fails to withstand close scrutiny,
the Court, nevertheless, must be credited with providing a precise definition of the preemption
test.
53. See text accompanying notes 37-52 supra.
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the structure of the Supreme Court's past preemption cases. The Court
clearly indicated that it would evaluate the constitutionality of Califor-
nia's community property laws vis-a-vis the two-part preemption test
articulated in prior case law. 4
The Court devoted most of its analysis to determining whether the
express terms of the federal statutes governing military retirement pay
conflicted with California's community property laws and found that a
conflict did exist. Specifically, the Court pointed to congressional lan-
guage defining military retired pay as the "personal entitlement" of the
service member." The Court reasoned that because community prop-
erty laws permitted the division of retirement pay, those laws reduced
the pension benefits to something less than a "personal entitlement."
That unanticipated reduction therefore evidenced a conflict in express
terms.
The Court next sought to strengthen its finding that military retire-
ment pay represented the serviceman's "personal entitlement" by fo-
cusing on two statutory provisions governing pension benefits. First,
the Court noted that Title 10 of the United States Code section 2771
permits a servicemember to designate a beneficiary other than his
spouse to receive any unpaid arrearages in retired pay upon his death. 6
This, reasoned the Court, was inconsistent with the normal principles
of community property law which grant an interest to the surviving
spouse in all compensation earned by the deceased spouse during mar-
riage. For the majority, therefore, the servicemember's statutory right
to designate whomever he pleased indicated Congress' intent that mili-
tary retired pay constitute a "personal entitlement."
The Court next examined the Survivor Benefit Plan57 and the Re-
54. The Court did offer a novel argument not offered in the other preemption cases. The
Court indicated that military retirement pay could properly be classified as reduced compensation
for reduced, but currently rendered services. This was so because the military retiree remains a
member of the Army, is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, may forfeit all or part of
his retired pay if he engages in certain prohibited behavior, remains subject to recall to active duty
at any time, etc. And if military retired pay was considered reduced compensation for currently
rendered services, the divorced spouse would have no interest in such pay under community prop-
erty law, since the compensation would constitute earnings after marriage. See note 21 supra.
Although the court noted that it had already defined military retired pay as reduced compensa-
tion for reduced current services, the Court nevertheless concluded that it would not rely on that
argument but instead would decide the case under the preemption standard. 453 U.S. at 221-22.
55. Id. at 224 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1968)).
56. Section 2771 provides in relevant part:
(a) In the settlement of the accounts of a deceased member of the armed forces.., an
amount due from the armed forces of which he was a member shall be paid to the person
highest on the following list. . . (1) Beneficiary designated by him in writing to receive
such amount ... (2) Surviving spouse, (3) Children. . . (4) Father and mother...
(5) Legal representative...
10 U.S.C. §2771 (1976).
57. 10 U.S.C. §§1447-55 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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tired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan. 8 Both plans permit a ser-
vicemember to reduce his retired pay in order to provide an annuity for
the surviving spouse or children. Importantly, however, neither plan
stipulates that the surviving spouse must be designated as the benefici-
ary. That finding led the Court to conclude that "it is clear that if re-
tired pay were community property, the servicemember could not so
deprive the spouse of his or her interest in the property."59 Instead,
reasoned the Court, retired pay represented a "personal entitlement."
The Court offered a third argument in support of its finding that mil-
itary retired pay was not subject to community property laws. The
Court traced the legislative history of the Survivor Benefit Plan and
found that Congress had explicitly rejected a proposal "that would
have allowed attachment of up to 50% of military retired pay to comply
with a court order in favor of a spouse, former spouse or child. '60 That
provision, according to the McCarty majority, evidenced Congress' de-
sire that "military retired pay 'actually reach the beneficiary.' "61
Tracing the legislative history of the Survivor's Benefit Plan even
further, the Court noted that although a 1975 amendment to the Social
Security Act 62 provided that all federal benefits, including those paya-
ble under the Survivor Benefit Plan, were subject to legal process to
enforce child support or alimony obligations, Congress had specified
that alimony "does not include any payment or transfer of property
[made] in compliance with any community property settlement. 63 The
Court believed this reflected Congress' overriding concern that the ser-
vicemember actually receive the intended benefits.
Having found that the express terms of the military retirement
scheme conflicted with the operation of community property laws, the
Court next proceeded to evaluate the second part of the preemption
test. The Court found that "the application of community property
principles to military retired pay threatens grave harm to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests."'6 The Court identified two federal inter-
ests involved in the retirement compensation scheme: (1) providing
economic support for the military retiree, and (2) meeting the personnel
management needs of the military. In the Court's estimation, the oper-
ation of community property laws would frustrate both objectives.
First, the Court feared that the division of retirement pay pursuant to
58. Id. §§1431-46 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
59. 453 U.S. at 226.
60. Id. at 228-29.
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. §659 (1976).
63. 453 U.S. at 230 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §462(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
64. Id. at 232.
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community property laws would diminish the financial protection Con-
gress had intended for the military retiree. In the Court's estimation,
Congress had carefully calculated the economic needs of the military
.retiree and therefore the division of the retirement benefits upon disso-
lution would undermine the servicemember's ability to sustain himself.
Second, the Court objected to the frustrating effect community prop-
erty laws would have upon military recruitment. The Court wrote that
"It]he value of retired pay as an inducement for enlistment obviously
would be diminished to the extent that the servicemember recognized
that he or she might be involuntarily transferred to a state that would
divide that pay upon divorce."65
In summary, the Court found both parts of the federal preemption
test satisfied. The application of community property law conflicted
with the express terms of the federal statute, and the community prop-
erty law threatened grave harm to clear and substantial federal
interests.
V. THE McCARTY DECISION: SIDESTEPPING SUBSTANCE
Viewed in terms of form, the majority opinion appears cogent and
perfectly consistent with prior case law. The Court unequivocally set
forth the Hisquierdo preemption test and then structured its analysis in
terms of that standard. Viewing the Court's analysis only in terms of
form, however, proves unilluminating. Instead, emphasis must be
placed on substance. Although it is undeniable that the Court paid
homage to the words of the preemption test, a study of the Court's sub-
stantive application of the Hisquierdo test casts serious doubt upon the
analytic persuasiveness of the majority opinion.6 6
A. Conflict in Express Terms?
The majority found that the express terms of the federal statute cre-
ating military retirement pay conflicted with California's community
property law. That finding is analytically unpersuasive for three rea-
sons: (1) the controlling statute contains no express language commu-
nicating Congress' intent to preempt community property law, (2) the
express terms that the Court relied on come from the legislative histo-
ries of statutes only tangentially related to the statute in question,
65. Id. at 234.
66. "[l]n its constitutional aspect, McCarty combines the Supremacy Clause and the preemp-
tion doctrine in a push into outer space." Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty: Farewell to
Alms? at I (unpublished manuscript--copy on file at the Pacfc Law Journal). See also Kornfeld,
Supreme Court Majority Shoots Down Comrunity Property Division of Military Retired Pay, 8
COMMUNITY PROPERTY JOURNAL 187 (1981).
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(3) the express language relied upon is far too ambiguous to suggest
that Congress has "'positively required by direct enactment' that state
law be preempted."67
1. Sections 3911-3929 Contain No Language Evidencing Congress'
Intent to Preempt Community Property Law
Despite its efforts, the Court failed to present evidence that the ex-
press terms of the federal statute in question conflicted with state com-
munity property rules. The controlling statute is Title 10 of the United
States Code, Chapter 367, sections 3911-3929.68 Chapter 367 sets forth
provisions governing retirement for length of service. Ultimately, the
only provision in Chapter 367 cited by the Court was section 3929.
Section 3929 simply provides that "[a] member of the Army retired
under this Chapter is entitled to retired pay."69
The Court blandly asserted that "[t]he statutory language is straight-
forward. ' 70 Few would contest that point. But the plain meaning of
the quoted language suggests no conflict whatsoever with California's
community property law. The language contains nothing prohibiting
the application of community property law, nor does it mention the
general preemption of state law. All the statute specifies is that an
Army retiree is entitled to retirement compensation.
Prior case law dramatically illustrates the deficiency of the Court's
finding that section 3929 evidences a conflict in express terms. A return
to the Hisquierdo case is instructive. As detailed above, the Hisquierdo
court held that the Federal Railroad Retirement Act preempted the ap-
plication of community property law. The Court was careful to
pinpoint the statutory language evidencing the conflict in express terms
between the federal and state statutory schemes. The Court cited the
following language of section 231m of the Railroad Retirement Act:
"Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any state
• . . no annuity. . . shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to
garnishment, attachment, or legal process under any circumstance
whatsoever."71 The unequivocal language cited by the Hisquierdo
67. 453 U.S. at 234.
68. 10 U.S.C. §§3911-3929 (1976).
69. Id. §3929. It is absolutely essential to note that the only statute really in question is
section 3929. That section alone establishes army retirement pay based upon years of service.
Later in the Court's analysis, it highlights Title 10, U.S.C. section 1434 and section 1450 (1976)
(i.e., Survivor Benefit Plan, and Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan) in an effort to show
conflict in express terms. Citing those provisions, however, is deceptive since at most they concern
ancillary programs of the larger area of retirement pay. In order to evaluate the express terms of
the applicable statute, the Court would have had to focus upon sections 3911-3929.
70. 453 U.S. at 223-24,
71. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 576 (quoting 45 U.S.C. §231m).
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court poignantly illustrates the failure of the McCart Court to identify
language evidencing the necessary conflict.
Ironically, the Court itself probably recognized the absence of con-
flicting terms. As a result, the Court sought to redefine part one of the
preemption test. The Court argued that because the army retirement
scheme did not contain any language specifically endorsing the appli-
cation of a community property concept, Congress did not intend such
law to apply. 2 Quite casually, the Court turned the preemption test
upside down. The court suggested that the presumption of constitu-
tionality normally attaching to community property law was no longer
operative. Implicitly, the Court advanced a novel test: community
property law cannot apply in areas of federal programs unless Congress
specifically declares its intent that state law shall apply.
The Court never expressly acknowledged the metamorphosis. Per-
haps this was due to the force and clarity of prior case law. Instead,
after having overturned the past application of the preemption test, the
Court sought to support the holding along conventional lines. Thus,
the Court commenced an analysis of the Survivor Benefit Plan and the
Serviceman's Family Protection Plan in an effort to demonstrate that
the express terms of those provisions conflicted with the dictates of
community property law.
2. The Survivor Beneft Plan and the Serviceman's Family
Protection Plan Are Only Tangentially Related to the
Statute in Question
The Court noted that in adopting the Survivor Benefit Plan and the
Serviceman's Family Protection Plan, Congress had expressly defined
retirement pay as the serviceman's "personal entitlement." The Court
latched onto the term "personal entitlement" and concluded that the
phrase evidenced the conflict necessary to invoke the preemption doc-
trine. In the Court's estimation, a benefit could not remain a "personal
entitlement" if it were subject to equal division under state community
property laws.
The Court's reliance on the personal entitlement language is unper-
suasive in two respects. First, the Survivor Benefit Plan and the Ser-
viceman's Family Protection Plan are acts only tangentially related to
the statute in question. As detailed above, Chapter 367 governs retire-
72. The Court noted that, under the Railroad Retirement Act, a spouse of a retired worker
was entitled to a separate annuity that terminated upon divorce. The Court defined that program
as evidencing a limited community property concept. But the Court found that "unlike the Rail-
road Retirement Act, the military retirement system does not embody even a limited 'community
property concept."' 453 U.S. at 224.
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ment pay for length of service. Logically, the Court should have care-
fully analyzed the terms of Chapter 367, premising any finding of
preemption upon the express dictates of that chapter. Instead, the
Court identified language from Chapter 73 (sections 1431-1455).
Chapter 73 provides for annuities based upon retired or retainer pay
and sets forth the terms of the Survivor Benefit Plan and the Service-
man's Family Protection Plan. At the very most, the only connection
Chapter 73 has with Chapter 367 is that Chapter 73 permits a service-
man to reduce a portion of his Chapter 367 retired pay upon election in
order to provide an annuity for the surviving spouse or children. More
importantly, however, Chapter 73 is not the statutory provision that
governs retired pay for length of service. That the two programs inter-
sect in a limited fashion is not justification for substituting the terms
and legislative histories of the one act for the other. Writing in dissent,
Justice Rehnquist bluntly castigated the majority for its "diverting
analysis. . . of laws and legislative histories having little if anything to
do with the case at bar."7 3 The terms and legislative history of Chapter
73 appear to serve as an extremely weak foundation upon which to
preempt the application of community property law as it pertains to
Chapter 367 retired pay.74
A second fallacy also surfaces in the Court's "personal entitlement"
argument. To see the fallacy, it is important to recall that the Court
focused upon the "personal entitlement" language as proof that "the
express terms of federal law" precluded the application of the commu-
nity property concept. In a somewhat misleading fashion, however, the
Court set forth the term "personal entitlement" as if it were an express
term of the federal statute itself. The Court failed to properly under-
score that the quoted language does not appear in the statute itself, but
instead comes from a 1968 Senate Armed Services Committee Re-
port.75 The applicable test requires the Court to view the express terms
of the statute, not terms found in legislative histories. Whereas the His-
quierdo Court cited the express terms of federal law, the McCary
Court quoted language from a committee report. Preemption based
upon the former comports with prior case law; preemption premised
upon the latter is far less persuasive.
73. Id. at 237.
74. The Court analyzes the terms of the Survivor Benefit Plan as if Ms. McCarty were de-
manding payment thereunder. In reality, the Survivor Benefit Plan was not at issue. The facts
presented by the Court do not even mention whether or not Richard McCarty participated in the
plan. Ms. McCarty only argued that federal laws do not preempt the application of community
property law to Chapter 367 retired pay. She did not assert that community property law could be
used to defeat Congress' intentions concerning the Survivor Benefit Plan.
75. S. Rep. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1968).
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3. The Language that the Court Relies Upon As Evidence of a
Conflict in Express Terms is Far Too Ambiguous to
Suggest that Congress Has Positively Required
By Direct Enactment that Community
Property Law Be Preempted
Even if one concludes, as did the majority, that language discovered
in various legislative histories constitutes "express terms of federal
law," the Court's finding of preemption appears to lack justification on
still other grounds. The term "personal entitlement" is far too ambigu-
ous to satisfy the applicable test (i.e., "Congress has 'positively required
by direct enactment' that state law be preempted."76) The exact mean-
ing of "personal entitlement" is not self-evident. Black's Law Diction-
ary does not offer any definition. 7 In fact, other courts have
considered the meaning of "personal entitlement" and have defined the
phrase in terms far different than those offered by the McCarty Court.
For example, the California Supreme Court wrote:
Congress used the phrase "personal entitlement" to signify that re-
tirement benefits cease with the death of the serviceman, and provide
no continuing means of support for the serviceman's widow....
Congress' reference to military retirement benefits as the "personal
entitlement" of the serviceman occurs in the context of underscoring
the need for an annuity plan to provide for a deceased serviceman's
family.78
The McCarty Court defined "personal entitlement" as the service-
man's absolute right to receive all vested retired pay until death. Con-
versely, the California Supreme Court believed that "personal
entitlement" signified only the durational character of the serviceman's
right to pension benefits. The differing interpretations illustrate the in-
herent ambiguity in the phrase "personal entitlement." Such an am-
biguous term seems to fail to support the conclusion that "Congress has
'positively required by direct enactment' that state [community prop-
erty] law be preempted." The Court's findings to the contrary seem
unpersuasive, leading to the inevitable conclusion that the Court may
well have failed to satisfy the first part of the preemption test.
76. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). As Justice Rehnquist points out in
his dissent, the Court "[flor all its purported reliance on Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. . .fails either
to quote or cite the [applicable] test." 453 U.S. at 236. The McCarty Court ignored the "positively
required by direct enactment" standard. Id.
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
78. In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 599 n.8, 517 P.2d 449, 453, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1974).
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B. Do Community Property Laws Really Threaten Grave Harm to
Clear and Substantial Federal Interests?
The Court recited that "a mere conflict in words is not [a] suffi-
cient" 9 basis upon which to invoke the preemption doctrine. The
Court indicated that under Hisquierdo, it had to determine whether
"the application of community property principles to military retired
pay threatens grave harm to 'clear and substantial' federal interests"80
before it would invoke preemption. As with part one of the preemption
test, however, it seems that the Court observed the form of the test, but
refused to apply its substantive content.
For purposes of analysis, part two of the preemption test can be bro-
ken down into two components. First, the test requires a court to find
that the federal statute in question develops "clear and substantial fed-
eral interests." The McCarty Court satisfied that requirement. The
Court wrote that "Congress has enacted a military retirement system
designed to promote two major goals: to provide for the retired service
member, and to meet the personnel management needs of the active
military forces."'" The second component requires an inquiry into
whether the state law in question "threatens grave harm" to the clear
and substantial federal interests identified above. While the McCarty
Court found that such actual conflict did exist, it offered only some-
what conclusory remarks to support that finding.
The Court asserted that community property laws would frustrate
the personnel management needs of the military services. Those needs
entail attracting a young, vigorous, and capable staff. The Court
surmised that allowing an equal division of military retirement pay
pursuant to community property law would discourage persons from
enlisting in the armed services. In evaluating that argument, one must
ask "[w]ho ever refused to enlist [in the armed services] because a
spouse upon divorce might get a share of military pay?"8" An intelli-
gent answer to that question is impossible without statistical informa-
tion of some sort. Yet the Court provides no such documentation to
support its conclusions. Interestingly, the Court seems not to have been
without some information directly on point. One of the several amicus
briefs submitted to the Court presented information concerning a study
by the President's Commission on Military Compensation. 83 The re-
79. 453 U.S. at 232.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Foster & Freed, supra note 66, at 7.
83. Report of the President's Commission on Military Compensation (April 1979). It is true
that the Court makes brief reference to the Report in a footnote. See 453 U.S. at 234 n.26. ("A
recent Presidential Commission has questioned the extent to which the military retirement system
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port concluded that:
The retirement plan apparently has little influence on prospective re-
cruits. . . .This phenomenon results from the strong preferences
among young people for current income rather than deferred in-
come. For such persons, upfront compensation in the form of pay or
bonuses can be a much more effective incentive than retirement
[compensation] ... 84
It appears, then, that not only did the Court fail to document the puta-
tive adverse effects community property law has upon recruitment, but
that the Court actually ignored evidence that retirement benefits them-
selves do not even constitute a meaningful recruitment device.
The Court also failed to apply the test with the rigidity that the
words of the test demand. The standard is "grave harm," not "possible
impact." Therefore, even if one concedes that the tear of losing retire-
ment benefits in a divorce proceeding retards military recruitment, it
does not necessarily follow that such deterrence would rise to the level
of grave harm. The Court presented no evidence that the past opera-
tion of community property law has in fact retarded military recruit-
ment in our present, all voluntary military system. If that result has not
occurred, then it seems logical to conclude that applying community
property rules will not inflict grave harm upon military recruitment.
Any minuscule impact that those laws do have fails to justify preemp-
tion, since the test itself requires a showing of grave harm.
In a second effort to demonstrate the grave harm that community
property laws inflict upon the military scheme, the Court announced
that community property rules impair the retiree's ability to support
himself. In particular, the Court lamented that an equal division order
upon divorce would reduce the retiree's compensation below a care-
fully considered level adopted by Congress.
The argument has some merit. It is important to consider whether
community property awards create state welfare dependents out of re-
tired servicemen. As in the case above, however, the Court seems to
fail to provide any evidence stronger than conclusory statements. Fur-
ther, the Court seems to ignore the fact that federal law currently al-
lows the garnishment of up to one-half of the serviceman's retirement
pay in order to satisfy an alimony or child support judgment.85 Evi-
accomplishes [its stated] goals."). But the Court makes no real attempt to integrate the findings of
the Report into its own analysis. Having cited the report, the Court simply proceeds as if there
were no available evidence questioning the effectiveness of the military retirement program as a
stimulus to military recruitment.
84. Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Certain Members of Congress and Organizations at 34,
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (quoting, Report of The President's Commission on Military
Compensation 27 (April, 1979)) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
85. 42 U.S.C. §659 (1976).
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dently, Congress is concerned with more than the serviceman's ability
to sustain himself. Congress is also concerned about the welfare of the
serviceman's ex-spouse and family. It must also be realized that the
maximum community property award (50% of serviceman's retirement
benefits) would be no greater than the amount of retirement pay sub-
ject to garnishment for alimony and child support. A community prop-
erty award would not reduce the serviceman's income below a level
Congress has implicitly regarded as sufficient for basic support.
The military pension benefits issue has sparked emotional responses
from all sides, revealing a paucity of analytically sound reasoning. For
that very reason, an amicus of the Court urged the Court not to be
influenced by such emotionalism, but rather to pursue a rigorous, ana-
lytical approach. The amicus wryly admonished that
[It] has .been argued that a decision upholding community property
law would unjustly reduce retirement benefits of the bachelor sailor
who has too much to drink one evening and wakes up the next morn-
ing only to find that he got married the night before. While such
stories may be the grist of Hollywood script writers, we suggest that
the incidence of such events in real life is so slight that the argument
can fairly be disregarded.86
The lack of documentation for the Court's assertions that community
property law inflicts grave harm upon the military retirement system
leads one to the conclusion that the Court's decision may well have
been a product of the very emotionalism it was cautioned to avoid.
The Court did not present persuasive support for its finding of preemp-
tion under the two-part Hisquierdo test.
VI. rJDGw.AY . -PRDGWAY: HISQUIERDO/MCCARTY CONFLICT
L Introduction: The Conflict
In the McCarty case the Supreme Court used a preemption test ma-
terially different from that offered by the Court in Hisquierdo. With
regard to part one of the preemption test, McCarty implied that state
family property law would not apply in the area of federal programs
unless Congress specifically provided that such law should apply.
87
Conversely, Hisquierdo clearly held that state community property law
did apply to federal programs unless Congress had positively pre-
empted state law by direct enactment."" The two decisions also differ
as to the application of part two of the preemption test. While the
Court in both cases acknowledged that a mere conflict in words was not
86. Brief, supra note 84, at 33-34.
87. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
1982 / Federal Preemption of Family Property Law
a sufficient basis upon which to predicate preemption, and while both
Courts set forth identical language in defining part two of the test,8 9
only the Hisquierdo Court applies the test with the rigidity that the
words of the test would seem to demand. Commentators have viewed
that the McCarty formulation of part two of the test is whether "there is
potential harm to possible federal interests." 90
In his dissent in McCarty, Justice Rehnquist commented on the un-
certainty that follows in the wake of the McCarty decision. He wrote,
"I am not certain whether the analysis was wrong in Hisquierdo or in
[McCarty], but it is clear that both cannot be correct. One is led to
inquire where this moving target will next appear.' '91 The subject of
Justice Rehnquist's concern appeared only four and one-half months
later when the Court again addressed the problem of federal preemp-
tion of state family law in Ridgway v. Ridgway.92
The Ridgway Court embraced the novel preemption standard ad-
vanced in McCarty rather than the traditional approach set forth in
Hisquierdo. The following analysis will illustrate the force and effect
that the McCarty decision has exerted on the preemption standard as it
is applied in the area of family property law.
2. Background
On December 7, 1977 a Maine divorce court granted Richard and
April Ridgway an order terminating their marriage.93 The court or-
dered Richard, a sergeant in the United States Army, to provide con-
tinuing child support for his three children.94 As part of that order the
court directed Richard "'to keep in force the life insurance policies on
his life [then] outstanding for the benefit of the. . . three children.' ,95
At the time of the divorce, Richard maintained a life insurance policy
issued under the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act96 ("SGLIA").
89. The language used in both cases was whether the application of state law would "do
'major damage' to 'clear and substantial federal interests." 453 U.S. at 220; 439 U.S. at 581.
90. Comment, McCarty v. McCarty, 12 FAM. L. REP. 1650, 1662 (1981).
91. 453 U.S. at 244 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
93. Id. at 48.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. 38 U.S.C. §§765-79 (1976). SGLIA is a federally sponsored life insurance program
adopted for the benefit of military servicemembers. In providing the background history of the
SLGIA, the Ridgway Court wrote
In order to make the insurance available through a commercial carrier at a reasonable
rate, notwithstanding the special mortality risks that service members often must assume,
Congress undertook to subsidize [a federal] program. . . .A sum representing the extra
premium for special mortality risks is periodically deposited by the United States into a
revolving fund that is used to pay premiums on the master policy... .The fund other-
wise is derived primarily from deductions withheld from service members' pay. ...
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Richard remarried less than four months after the dissolution of his
first marriage.9 7 Almost immediately thereafter, he changed the pol-
icy's beneficiary designation, directing that the insurance proceeds be
paid "as specified 'by law.' "98 Richard died less than a year later.99
His first wife, April, then instituted an action to enjoin the payment of
the policy proceeds and to obtain a declaratory judgment stipulating
that the benefits were properly payable to the three children of the first
marriage."c° The Maine trial court denied April the relief she re-
quested, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine granted her request
and directed that she be named as constructive trustee of the policy
proceeds."' The United States Supreme Court then granted
certiorari. 10 2
The precise issue addressed in Ridgway was whether "an insured ser-
viceman's beneficiary designation under a life insurance policy issued
pursuant to the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act'0 3 prevails over
a constructive trust imposed upon the policy by a state court decree."'104
Finding that the pertinent federal statute 0 5 preempted the application
of state family property law, the Court held that the insurance proceeds
were not subject to the constructive trust established by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court.' 6
3. The Rationale: McCarty Reapplied
The Ridgway Court applied part one of the preemption test in a fash-
ion very similar to the approach taken by the Court in McCarty. It is
important to note that the Court in Ridgway did not set forth the lan-
guage of part one of the Hisquierdo preemption test,10 7 but instead
cited the less rigorous McCarty test which had failed to cite or quote
Accordingly, depending upon the conditions faced by the service members at any given
time, the program may be financed in part with federal funds. ....
454 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 48.
98. Id. Section 770(a) of the Act, 38 U.S.C. §770(a) (1976), provides that in the absence of a
named beneficiary, the proceeds of the policy are payable "to the widow or widower of such
member or former member." Id. By removing April's name and stipulating that the beneficiary
be chosen as provided "by law," Richard sought to have the policy payments directed to his
second wife (Ze., the only legal widow). Id
99. 454 U.S. at 49.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 50.
102. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
103. 38 U.S.C. §§765-79 (1976).
104. 454 U.S. at 47.
105. Ie., the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§765-79 (1976).
105. 454 U.S. at 60.
107. Hisquierdo defined part one of the test as follows: "whether Congress has 'positively
required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted." 439 U.S. at 581 (citing Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
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the precise test advanced in part one of Hisquierdo. "° Rather than ask-
ing "whether Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment'
that state law be preempted,"' 9 the Ridgway Court simply asked
whether there were "clearly conflicting federal enactments."' 10
Having discarded the strictures of the Hisquierdo standard, the Court
determined that preemption was appropriate even though the Court
identified no evidence that Congress had addressed the question of the
applicability of state family property law and had specifically decided
that state law should not apply. The Court cited two statutory provi-
sions in support of its holding. First, the Court noted that SGLIA and
implementing statutes"' permit the insured to "designate any person as
a policy beneficiary."' 2 Secondly, the Court cited section 770(g) of the
Act. Section 770(g) specifies that "[p]ayments of benefits [under
SGLIA]. .. shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not
be liable to attachment. . . under any legal or equitable process. '' 13
Read together, the two provisions above fail to indicate that Con-
gress has positively required that SGLIA displace the normal operation
of state family and family property law. In finding that the language of
SGLIA satisfied part one of the preemption test, the Court applied the
type of reverse presumption of constitutionality adopted by McCarty.
In other words, the Court suggested that because SGLIA did not spe-
cifically endorse the application of state marital property law, Congress
108. Rehnquist in his dissent in McCarty chastised the Court for failing "either to quote or
cite the test for pre-emption which Hisquierdo established." 453 U.S. at 236 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
109. 439 U.S. at 581 (citation omitted).
110. 454 U.S. at 55.
111. 38 C.F.R. §§916(a) & (d) (1980).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. 38 U.S.C. §770(g) (1976). Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens persuasively argues that the
anti-attachment provision (§770(g)) was enacted to protect the policy proceeds from the claims of
commercial creditors and not to prevent dependent children from asserting rights therein. 454
U.S. at 73-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens writes
The language cited in the "anti-attachment" provision of SGLIA is comparable to that
found in so-called "spendthrift clauses" that have protected trust beneficiaries from the
claims of commercial creditors for centuries. As stated by Dean Griswold, "[i]t is widely
held, however, that even where such trusts are valid, the interest of the beneficiary may
be reached for the support of his wife or children, or for the payment of alimony to his
wife."
Id. at 74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens concludes by
writing
The federal interest incorporated within exemption statutes is an interest in preventing
federally-supported benefits from satisfying claims of commercial creditors. Although
such claims are certainly valid, they arise solely from a personal obligation of the debtor,
and should not be borne by the public through payment from general revenues. Claims
based on familial obligation, however, are of a different character, and indeed may be
precisely the type of claim for which the federal benefit was intended. Absent some indi-
cation that Congress intended the standard exemption provision contained in the SGLIA to
bar a minor child's claim for support, J am unwilling to conclude that this prvision of the
statutepreempts the application of state law in this case.
Id. at 78-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 14
intended such law not to apply. The Court evidently was moved by the
fact that "[t]he legislation itself says nothing about contrary dictates of
state law or state judgments."' 14
The Ridgway Court also followed the McCarly analysis with regard
to the application of part two of the preemption test. Like the Court in
McCary, the Ridgway Court began its analysis of part two of the test
by citing the words of the Hisquierdo test." 5 The Court specified that
"[s]tate family and family property law must do 'major damage' to
'clear and substantial' federal interests"" 6 before preemption would
occur. But as was the case in McCarty, the Court in Ridgway failed to
apply the test consistently with the plain meaning of the language. One
commentator explained that the real test applied by Ridgway was
whether "there is potential harm to possible interests."'
1 7
The Court identified servicemember morale as the primary federal
interest at stake. The majority reasoned that the "[plossession of gov-
ernment insurance, payable to the relative of his choice, might well
directly enhance the morale ofthe serviceman."' "I The Court went on to
explain that SGLIA makes "insurance available through a common
carrier at a reasonable rate, notwithstanding the special mortality risks
that servicemembers often must assume."" 9 Although the Ridgway
Court was able to identify the clear and substantial interests at stake,
the Court failed to take the additional step of showing how the applica-
tion of state marital property law would cause major damage to those
interests.' 20 The Court mentioned that the divorce decree ordered by
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court would defeat Richard's ability to
114. Id. at 54. The criticism Justice Rehnquist directed toward the majority in McCarty is
appropriate here. The criticism was paraphrased by a commentator as follows:
Under Hisquierdo, the absence of any federal community property scheme at all would
have been thought to suggest that there was no preemption. . . .The majority in Me-
Carty [and Ridgway] has turned this reasoning around and we are told that preemption
of state community property law is suggested in the case because there is no community
property concept at all in the federal statutory scheme.
Kornfeld, supra note 66, at 193.
115. The reader should be reminded that the Ridgway Court did not pay part one of the
Hisquierdo test the same deference. While the Court in Ridgway cited part two of the Hisf uierdo
test, it did not cite the language of part one of that test. See notes 107-110 and accompanying text
supra.
116. 454 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
117. Comment, supra note 90, at 1828 (emphasis in original).
118. 454 U.S. at 56 (quoting Witssner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 660 (1950) (emphasis added)).
119. 454 U.S. at 52. The Court also wrote that "It]he federal interest is especially strong be-
cause a substantial share of the proceeds of an SGLIA policy may be attributable to general tax
revenues." Id. at 57. The Court here seems to confuse the purpose of the analysis at hand. The
fact that taxpayers spend a lot of money on the SGLIA program does not evidence the federal
interest per se; the expenditure of large sums of money simply illustrates the commitment the
public has made towards advancing the federal interest of building serviceman morale.
120. Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens makes specific reference to the Court's failure to satisfy
part two of the test. Justice Stevens wrote, "[n]otwithstanding the absence of any such major
damage," the Court has ordered preemption. 454 U.S. at 72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1982 / Federal Preemption of Family Property Law
designate whomever he wished to receive the SGLIA insurance pro-
ceeds. It failed to demonstrate, however, how the application of such
state family property law would destroy morale in general. The appli-
cable test cited by the Court was major harm not possible impact; I yet
the Court did not produce evidence satisfying the terms of the test it
cited as controlling.
VII. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE IMPACT OF THE
UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION
ACT UPON THE MCCARTY PREEMPTION
STANDARD
In August, 1982 the United States Congress enacted the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act.122 The Act stipulates that
court[s] may treat disposable [military] retired or retainer pay paya-
ble to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either
as property solely of the member or asproperty of the member andhis
spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court/sj.12'
The legislative history of the Act unequivocally indicates that the pur-
pose of the measure is to reverse the result dictated by McCarty.2 4 In
other words, the Act specifically contemplates permitting state courts to
121. Justice Stevens points out in his dissent that the preemption of state law (not its applica-
tion) would pose the real threat to the servicemen. He writes
[I]t is ironic that today's decision may harm federal interests in a more tangible way
than that ascribed to the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. As a result of
the holding today, a commitment to keep military insurance in effect for one's children is
not legally binding. In the future, a serviceman in divorce negotiations may be forced to
purchase new insurance from a private insurer in order to provide fair assurance that his
support obligation will remain satisfied in the event of his death. For many servicemen,
such private insurance may not be easy to obtain. Surely there is no federal interest in
depreciating the value of this insurance.
454 U.S. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Former Spouses' Protection Act, supra note 13. The Act was attached as a rider to the
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982. Id.
123. §1408(c)(1). The language of the Act originated in a Senate bill introduced by Senator
Jepsen, the Chairperson of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower. See S. 1814,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); see also 127 Cong. Rec. S12901-04 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1981) (statement
of Senator Jepsen regarding S. 1814). In considering the legislative history of the Former Spouses'
Protection Act, one should consider the other congressional bills relating to the same subject mat-
ter. See S. 1453, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., (1981) S. 1648, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); S. 1772, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); H.R. 1711, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. H.R. 3039, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1981); H.R.
4902, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981). The scope and the content of the proposals vary widely, reflect-
ing conflicting goals among the drafters. Nevertheless, the bills read as a whole indicate that the
congressional response to McCarty was quite strong.
124. The House Report documenting the purpose of the Act specifies that the measure "would
have the effect of reversing the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Mc-
Carty v. McCarty which held that a court could not order a division of nondisability retired pay as
part of a distribution of community property incident to a divorce proceeding." H.R. Rep. No.
749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1982). See also 128 Cong. Rec. H4717 (daily ed. July 28, 1982)
(comments of Rep. Schroeder) ("The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the
United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty. . . which prohibited State courts from con-
sidering military retired pay as marital property according to their own domestic relations law").
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divide military pension benefits at divorce pursuant to local family
property law.
In assessing the impact that the Uniformed Former Spouses' Protec-
tion Act will have upon the McCarty decision, it is crucial to determine
the scope of the congressional response. An inquiry into the breadth of
the action taken by Congress reveals that Congress intended only to
change the result dictated by McCarty, not to disturb the rationale of-
fered by the Court in support of its holding. Thus, the preemption test
formulated by the McCarty Court retains precedential value. 125
A review of the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act indicates the lim-
ited scope of Congress' response to the McCarty decision. In introduc-
ing the legislation before the House of Representatives,
Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder stated that the "purpose of the bill
is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
McCary."'126 Congresswoman Schroeder made no mention that Con-
gress' underlying intent was to force the Court to apply a different pre-
emption standard. Instead, her comments indicate that Congress'
concern was only to circumvent the narrow holding reached by Me-
Carry. In essence, Congress viewed the task before it as one of clarifi-
cation. The McCarty Court had found that Congress did not wish state
marital property law to apply. Congress sought to inform the Court
125. The McCarty preemption test will retain precedential value notwithstanding the enact-
ment of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. That proposition derives sup-
port in two ways. First, if Congress did not even address the issue of whether the Court
articulated a constitutionally permissible preemption standard, then there could be no authority
for the proposition that the McCarty standard was overruled by the congressional action. Second,
case law is replete with examples of cases retaining precedential value even after Congress has
overruled the narrow holding of the case. The First Circuit faced the issue in Marriott In-Flite
Servs. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 202 (1st Cir. 1981). In Marriott, the court wrote
[Alithough Congress effectively overruled the Supreme Court's holding in Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 685... (1947), that foremen could organize into a
unit for purposes of collective bargaining, Packard is still cited for the proposition that
the Board's selection of an appropriate bargaining unit is rarely to be disturbed. See, for
example, Southern Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, International Union of Operating
Engr's, 425 U.S. 800, 805. . .(1976) (per curiam).
652 F.2d at 205, n.6 (citations omitted). The precise holding in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976) has also met congressional disapproval. In Gilbert the Court ruled that an em-
ployer's exclusion of pregnancy related benefits from coverage under disability benefit plans did
not constitute discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 145-
46. Congress later amended Title VII "to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in. . .Gilbert."
See Kirkhuff v. Cleland, 516 F. Supp. 351, 365 n.23 (D.D.C. 1981). But despite that fact, courts
have continued to recognize the precedential value of Gilbert. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,
273 (1981).
Even if one ignores the case law above and urges that the overruling of the narrow holding in
McCarty would affect McCartyr precedential value, the fact remains that Ridgway incorporated
the McCarty preemption test into its own analysis. Congress recent enactment does not affect the
factual basis upon which Ridgway was decided. Therefore, at the very least, the McCarty test is
fully incorporated into a case that clearly has not been overruled by Congress. McCarty will
continue to have precedential value.
126. 128 Cong. Rec. H4717 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (emphasis added).
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that it had reached a faulty conclusion. Congressman Donnelly ex-
plained that the Act simply "clarifies the intent of Congress concerning
military pensions." 27
Rather than undermining the preemption standard set forth in Mc-
Carty, the Congressional action reinforces the strength of the new test.
Commentators have recognized that McCarty formulated a novel ap-
proach when it held that preemption would occur unless Congress ex-
pressed its intent that state family property law should apply.12 There
can be no doubt that Congress itself recognized the general nature of
that new preemption test. Several congressmen echoed the sentiment
that McCarty stood for the proposition "that military retirement pay
could no longer be considered a marital asset subject to division in di-
vorce proceedings because of the lack of a federal statute permitting
such action." '129 To correct that result, Congress adopted a federal stat-
ute expressly providing for the applicability of state law."
VIII. THE AFTERMATH: POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF
MCCARTY AND RIDGW4Y
The precise impact that the McCarty and Ridgway decisions will
have upon future case law and the federal preemption standard is un-
clear at this point. The following analysis will briefly highlight three
possible trends.
A. De Minimis Effect
In the first instance, the McCarty case may prove to have no more
than a de minimis effect upon future case law and the preemption stan-
dard. Specifically, courts and commentators might overestimate the
scope of recent congressional action. Rather than viewing the enact-
ment of the Uniformed Former Spouses' Protection Act as a narrowly
tailored political response aimed at circumventing the result dictated
127. 128 Cong. Rec. H4720 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
128. For a general discussion of the reformulation of the McCarty standard see notes 66-86
and accompanying text supra.
129. 128 Cong. Rec. H4725 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (comments of Rep. Bedell) (emphasis
added). See also 128 Cong. Rec. H4722 (daily ed. August 16, 1982) (Congressional Whitehurst
commented that "the McCarty decision ... held that in the absence of a Federal statute permit-
ting such action, a State court may not order a division of military retired pay."); 128 Cong. Rec.
H4723 (daily ed. August 16, 1982) (Congresswoman Oakar stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has
ruled that in the absence of a Federal Statute to the contrary, a State court may not order a
division of military retired pay.").
130. Former Spouses' Protection Act, supra note 13. To illustrate that Congress accepted the
McCarty preemption standard, reference is made to the statement of Congressman Donnelly. He
stated that the "amendment clarifies the intent of Congress concerning military pensions as urged
by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in McCarty." 128 Cong. Rec. at H4720 (emphasis added).
Donnelly seems to indicate that Congress acted only because state family property law would not
have applicability unless Congress enacted a federal statute directly on point.
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by McCarty,"3 I the congressional action may be interpreted as a direc-
tive requiring the Court to readopt the Hisquierdo preemption analysis.
In short, courts and commentators might believe that the Act specifi-
cally addressed the efficacy of the new preemption standard and or-
dered the Court to revise its evaluation of the analytical process
compelled by the Supremacy Clause.
B. Impact Upon Special Military Programs
As a second possibility, the McCarty decision may have a pervasive
impact, but one limited to the area of federal military programs. The
Supreme Court recently noted in a case involving federal draft registra-
tion 132 that in matters involving "Congress' authority over national de-
fense and military affairs, . . . the Court [has] accorded Congress
greater deference [than usual]."1 33 The belief that Congress is entitled
to special deference when it acts in areas involving military affairs may
well explain the preemption test formulated in McCarty and later
adopted in Ridgway. After all, the McCarty standard creates a pre-
sumption against the applicability of state family property law. Such a
presumption could possibly insulate Congress' military programs from
unanticipated state intereference. It should be recalled that military
benefit programs were at issue in both McCarty and in Ridgway. If
courts adopt the above interpretation, the Hisquierdo standard will con-
tinue to apply in cases that do not involve military programs, while the
McCarty standard will apply only in cases involving special military
programs.134
Even if courts do not interpret McCarty as having established a spe-
cial preemption test for cases involving military programs and family
property disputes, courts may nevertheless accept McCarty as requiring
a "hands off" approach to cases involving special military benefits.
Both McCarty and Ridgway stress the point that certain military bene-
fits are the "personal entitlement" of those actually serving in the mili-
tary. 135 Although Congress has recently indicated that military pension
131. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
132. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
133. Id. at 64-65.
134. L., the McCarty Court's presumption of the non-applicability of state marital property
law. Stated another way, because the law of domestic relations belongs to the states and not the
federal government, the Hisquierdo presumption of constitutionality will apply in most family law
cases. But where family law becomes intertwined with military programs, there will be a pre-
sumption of the nonapplicability of state family law. To overcome that latter presumption, Mc-
Carty indicates that Congress must specifically declare that state marital property law can apply to
military programs.
135. The Court in McCarty stated that the military pension benefits were the "personal entitle-
ment" of the service member. 453 U.S. at 224. In Ridgway, the Court wrote that certain rights
under SGLIA were "personal to the member alone." 454 U.S. at 60.
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benefits are divisible under state property law, Congress has not ad-
dressed itself to countless other special military benefit programs. Be-
cause of that, the "hands off" approach of McCarty could find further
expression in judicial opinions.
C Widespread, General Impact
The third possibility, and by far the most ominous, is that courts will
view the McCarty and Ridgway decisions as overruling past standards
governing the preemption of marital property laws. In that case, a new
preemption standard would apply-preemption would occur "1) when-
ever Congress has not specifically permitted the application of state
law, [and] 2) when there is potential harm to possible federal
interests." 13 6
Congress' recent enactment of the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act also recognizes and responds to the Court's
new formulation of the preemption standard. 137 Comments found in
the legislative history of the Act indicate that Congress read McCarty
to stand for the proposition that "in the absence of a Federal statute to
the contrary,"' 38 state marital property law cannot apply. If McCarty
actually does require Congress to detail its intent that state family law
should apply, then Congress' response can only be described as evi-
dencing compliance with a court imposed requirement of specificity.
D. Conclusion
The precise impact that the McCarty decision will continue to have
upon the preemption standard, as it is applied to cases involving mari-
tal property law, is presently uncertain. Nevertheless, what is clear is
that the true significance of McCarty lies not in its now antiquated in-
terpretation of Congress' intent- concerning military pension benefits,
but rather in the Court's analysis of the preemption standard itself.
Broad implications arise from the Court's analysis of the preemption
standard. Those implications involve notions concerning American
federalism. Before McCarty, there could be no doubt that "[tihe whole
subject of the domestic relation of husband and wife. . . [belonged] to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." 139 Pre-
emption occurred only when Congress "'positively required by direct
enactment' ,'4 that state family property law should yield. After Mc-
136. Comment, Ridgway v. Ridgway, 6 FAM. L. REP. 1822, 1828 (1982).
137. See supra note 90.
138. 128 Cong. Rec. H4723 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (Statement of Rep. Oakar).
139. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
140. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (citing Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S.
68, 77 (1904)).
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Carty, and particularly in light of Ridgway, those notions carry less
force. McCarty seems to have reversed the presumption of constition-
ality formerly protecting state family property law. At the very least,
the case introduces novel elasticity in the application of the preemption
test. Either way, the approach toward federal preemption advanced by
McCarty represents an unsupported intrusion upon the "power [of the
states] to determine laws concerning marriage and property in the ab-
sence of Congress' 'direct enactment' to the contrary."'
14 1
141. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 246 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
